

8
The Resurrection of the same Numerical Body, and
its Reunion to the same Soul;

Asserted in a

S E R M O N

Preached before the

University of OXFORD,

At St Mary's

On Easter-Monday, 1725.

In which Mr *Lock's* Notions of Personality and
Identity are confuted. And the Author of
the Naked Gospel is answered.

By HENRY FELTON D. D. Principal of *Edmund
Hall*, Rector of *Whitwell*, and Chaplain to his Grace
the Duke of *Rutland*.

Εκτίθει δὲ Ἀλεξανδρίτης πάλιν σοφίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει τῷ πᾶσι ζῶν φύσει σὺν
ταῖς οἰκείαις δυνάμει συγκεῖναι, ἐνταῦθα περὶ φύσεως ἑκάστης ἑκάστη, καὶ
περὶ καὶ τῆς, καὶ ὅσα κατασκευῇ, καὶ ὑπὸ θηρίων ἢ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων
ζῶν κατασκευασθῇ, καὶ τῷ παντὸς σώματος ἐκκεῖναι, περὶ διαλυθῇ τῶν
ἄλλων μερῶν. ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάλιν ἀλλήλοις, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχει χώραν περὶ
τὸ ὅτι αὐτὸ σώματος ἀρμογίας τι ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ὅτι περὶ τῆς ἑκκεῖναι ἢ καὶ
πάντη Ἀλεξανδρίτης ἀνάστασις καὶ ζωὴ.

Athenag. περὶ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν.

O X F O R D,

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Imprimatur,

J O. MATHER

Vice-Can. OXON

May 6. 1725.



P. 5. l. 3. read *Individual*.

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND
FATHER IN GOD
EDWARD
LORD BISHOP
OF
Coventry and Lichfield.

My Lord,

THIS is one of the Anniversary Sermons,
which are always repeated at St Mary's
Church on Low Sunday: As it was heard
with good Acceptance by the University,
I promise my self it will find a kind Reception at
your Lordship's hands; especially since the Design of
it is to defend an Important Article of our Faith
a 2 against

*against the Attempts of Infidels and Socinians under
Whatever Form they have appear'd, whether masked
or barefaced, Naked or Disguised.*

I have not touched upon any part of the Controversy between the most learned Dr Stillingfleet late Lord Bishop of Worcester, and Mr Lock, but have only considered Mr Lock's Notions of Personality and Identity, as the Hypothesis, by which he would solve all Difficulties about the Resurrection; and, as he applies them, we find, he would persuade us, that upon his Scheme we may without any Difficulty conceive the same Person at the Resurrection tho' in a Body not exactly in Make or Part the same he had here, the same Consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it whether (I may add, for so he means) that Soul be the same, he had here, or no. Which is to say, that the Person may be the same, tho' neither Body nor Soul be the same, and so for any thing the Soul signifies Personality as well as Identity may consist in Consciousness alone. But I will add no more, lest I should seem to convey a Preface under the Cover of a Dedication.

Your Lordship's most learned Labours so highly deserving of the Christian World will doubtless by GOD's Blessing meet with Success equal to their Applause; and that Treasure of Learning so clearly opened and displayed may prove a blessed Instrument in the Hands of GOD to open the Eyes of his Ancient People, when they shall see more evidently, than has yet been shown them, how the Gospel is established and may be proved to them, upon their own Sense of those Sacred Writers, whom they have received into their Canon of Scripture.

You

Your Defence is able, if any Ingenuity remains in Him, to convince even the Nameless Author, you have overthrown, and (were that necessary, as he sadly pretends) to make Him a Christian in his own Way.

It must look very Ridiculous and Absurd to see the Grounds and Reasons of Christianity proposed by an Unbeliever, who with equal Ignorance and Malice, and with Phlegm answerable to both endeavours to prove that It hath no Foundation but in Allegorical and Fanciful Interpretations, and when he has shew'd after his manner of Representing it, that the Allegory does not hold, he has shew'd, he thinks, according to his Scheme, that It has no Reason or Foundation at all. Your Lordship has exposed his Ignorance: His Boldness must be repressed by Others.

It was not for Nothing, that in his Preface he entered his Plea for a general Liberty, that Every Man upon Every Subject should speak his Mind freely without Controul: He knew very well, how much Occasion he should have for such an Indulgence. Your Lordship has taken a proper Notice of the Propagation of his wicked Opinions, and at the same time of his Majesty's most Christian Zeal, and the ready Assistance of his Ministry to stop the Progress of them.

I esteem it one part of the Blessings God has given me, that I am a Member of your Lordship's Diocese: and as such I could not properly inscribe an Argument of this Nature to any Name but your Lordship's.

Your Goodness to your Clergy, Your most Effectual Exhortations to the Faith and Discipline of the Church of England upon true Catholic Principles,
and

and to inviolable Loyalty to his Majesty, and his Government, have endeared You to us and to all Good Men, who love the Church of England, and the Protestant Succession.

I trust your Lordship will pardon the Boldness of this Address, and that you may long live an Ornament of the Church to Vindicate her Faith, and Maintain her Government, as you have, not only in your Writings, but in your Excellent Charges delivered to your Clergy most worthily done, against all Loose and Destructive Notions, is the hearty and earnest Prayer of, my Lord,

Your Lordship's

Most Dutiful Son,

Edmund Hall,
May 6. 1725.

and most Obedient Servant,

HENRY FELTON

1 Cor. XV. 23.

*But every Man in his own Order:
Christ the First-fruits; afterward
They that are Christ's at his Coming.*

Saint Paul in this part of his Epistle treats professedly of the Resurrection of the Dead: and having laid the Resurrection of Christ for a Foundation, he proceeds to confute the Heresy of those, who said there was no Resurrection of the Dead, arguing reciprocally from Christ's Resurrection to Ours, and from Ours to Christ's, as they do mutually infer each other.

Those that acknowledge the Resurrection of Christ must according to the Apostle acknowledge also the Resurrection of the Dead, because if there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then Christ is not risen: and he drives them to this Strait, either to acknowledge the Resurrection of the Dead, or to deny the Resurrection of Christ.

St *Chrysostom* in his 39th Homily or Discourse on this Epistle does in a very just and lively Manner expose the Absurdities, to which they are reduced, who believe the Resurrection of Christ, and yet deny the Resurrection of the Dead: His Argumentation is beautiful and

A

strong,

strong, and proceeds upon these undoubted Principles of the Gospel Dispensation and Oeconomy: That there can be no reason assign'd for the Death and Resurrection of Christ, but on the account of Ours: That Christ is to be consider'd as Lord and Judge of the Dead: ' as the Head of the Body: and the First-fruits of the Dead. But He cannot be Judge of the Dead, if they were to lie in their Graves forever; neither can He be the Head of the Body unless the Members shall rise as well as the Head; nor the First-fruits from the Dead, unless the Dead do follow. These are necessary Relations, 'tis impossible to separate them, and to deny one is to deny the other. To deny the Resurrection of the Dead overthrows and vacates the whole Gospel at once: and if this be not admitted, no one Point of the Gospel is true. Our Preaching is false, our Faith is vain, we are yet in our Sins. There is an indissoluble Chain and Connection between Christ's Resurrection and Ours, and without Ours none of the great Ends and Purposes of the Gospel can be attain'd: Neither Salvation nor Condemnation, neither Rewards nor Punishment can succeed.

The whole Argument is summ'd up and put upon this short Alternative by joyning the sixteenth and twentieth verses, *If the Dead rise not then is not Christ risen; But Christ is risen, and become the First-fruits of them that slept.* Christ is risen, therefore we shall rise also.

So Natural is the Transition and so evident the Consequence from Christ's Resurrection to Ours ! *Since by Man came Death, by Man, that is by Christ the First-fruits, came also the Resurrection of the Dead : For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive : Yet not indiscriminately, in a Confused and Tumultuary Manner, But every Man in his own Order : Christ the First-fruits ; afterward They, that are Christ's, at his Coming.*

From these Words may be deduc'd,

- I. The General Resurrection of all Men.
- II. The Identity of the Body at the Resurrection.
- III. The Order in which every Man shall rise.

I. From these Words may be argu'd the General Resurrection of all Men, that shall be dead from the Beginning to the End of the World ; For tho' the Apostle in illustrating this Argument speaks only of the *Resurrection of the Just*, yet in laying out the Extent of it he speaks of the *Resurrection of all*. As Universally as all die in *Adam*, so Universally in *Christ* shall all be made alive. But our Lord himself hath taught us that all shall not rise to the same Blessed Condition of Life. *For the Hour is coming, in the which all that are in the Graves, shall hear his Voice, and shall come forth : They, that have done good, to the Resurrection of Life ; and they, that have done evil, to the Resurrection of Damnation.* Joh. 5. 29. And the Words of the Text setting forth the Order in which all shall be made alive, however they have been restrain'd to the Resurrection

of the *Just*, are doubtless to be understood of *All*. *All* that die in *Adam* shall be made alive in *Christ*; *Every Man* in his own Order. The Term is Universal. Every one is all without Exception of any. And St *Chrysostom* upon the place argues a General Resurrection not only from the Universality of the Term, but particularly from the Order in which *Every Man* shall rise; The *Just* first, afterward the *Unjust*.

II. As St *Chrysostom* argues a General Resurrection, 'Tertullian' from these Words clearly asserts the *Identity of the Body* for the Persons that shall rise, and the *Difference* of their *Merit*, for the Order in which they shall rise. For if Every Man rises in his own Order, Every Man must rise in his own Body; The Body that is dead must rise or there is no Resurrection, and Every Man must rise in his own Body, or Every Man cannot rise in his own Order. The Notion of *Identity* is here strictly confined to the very Body of every one that is dead: It is not enough to define what makes the same Person, if Man could be the same Person he was, without his own Body, the Question in the Resurrection is what makes the *same Body*, or whether the *same Body* shall be rais'd, and appropriated to the *same Man*, or the *same Person*, it belong'd to before. 'Tis with Respect to the *Body* alone, in which Man *dies*, that he is said to *rise*, and therefore unless he rises in the same Body he cannot rise at all. To give him another Body is not to raise that which is dead, this is forming a new one, not raising up the

old. And as far as the Body is a Constituent part of Man, as far as every Man in his own Body is an *Individual*, so far *another Body* makes *another Man*, and *another Man* makes *another Person*.

There is no one Point more labour'd in this Argument, than to avoid the Necessity of an *Identical Resurrection of the same Numerical Body*, and the strongest Efforts they were able to make, have been made by two Writers of the last Century: viz. the celebrated Author of an *Essay concerning Humane Understanding*: and the Author of the *Naked Gospel*. Both of them confine ¹ *Personality* to the *Soul*: Both of them the first expressly, the *Naked Gospel* by implication place *Identity* in ² *Consciousness alone*: Both of them make it indifferent to what Body the Soul is join'd, and the ³ last particularly considers the *Body* as nothing more than the *House we dwell in*, or the *Clothes we wear*. And indeed both their Reasonings end in the same Conclusion, and the *Body*, however it may make *Part* of the *Man*, is yet according to them no *Part* of the *Person*; and as by *Person* they mean the *Soul*, we arrive at this wise Determination, that *the Body is no part of the Soul*.

It is endless almost to follow the *first* thro' all his Notions of Identity and Person, and 'tis almost needless to spend the Time in Confuting the *broad Assertions* of the *last*, when barely

¹ Ess. B. II. c. 27. §. 9. To find wherein Personal Identity consists, we must consider what Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking Intelligent Being. *Naked Gosp.* part 1. p. 76. ² Ess. 10, &c. N. G. p. 76. ³ Ess. in the same chap. & passim. N. G. p. 76. 79.

to recite them is at the same time to expose them.

But I shall nevertheless to support the Doctrine of the Resurrection against their Attack consider what they have advanc'd in these three Notions ;

1. Concerning *Personality*.
2. Concerning *Identity*.
3. Concerning *the Body in its Relation to the Soul*.

And if all they have advanc'd upon these three Subjects should be admitted, it will follow perhaps, that there is no need that the same Body should rise, when any or none would do as well, but it will not follow against express Revelation, that there shall be no Resurrection of our Bodies which are laid in the Grave, or that the same Bodies shall not every one be rais'd and united to the same Soul, that departed from them.

But there is no need of granting their Notions, and a little Examination will shew at once the Extravagance and Falseness of them.

1. And first for *Personality*.

When the *Author* of the *Essay* was resolv'd to make *Identity* consist in *Consciousness alone*, it was necessary to make *Personality* consist only in the *Soul*. In order to this he makes a Distinction between ' *Substance Man* and *Person*, not only as if each could, but as if each ought to be conceiv'd without the other. It is true they are *distinct*, and we can consider *each* by it self in our Minds ; But when these *Ideas* are apply'd to one *Subject* in which they all *meet* and are con-

in'd, however we may *abstract* and *separate* them in our *Thoughts*, we cannot *separate* them in the *Nature* and *Existence* of things. Tho' every *Substance* is not *Man*, yet every *Man* is a *Substance*; tho' every *Person* is not *Man*, yet every *Man* is a *Person*: We say, that *Man* consists of *two Substances*: one *Material*, which is the *Body*; the other *Spiritual*, which is the *Soul*; and from the *Conjunction* of *Both* results the *Person*. The *Person* of *Man* is not his *inward Nature alone*, but his *outward Appearance*, his *visible Body* also, that which we see, converse and transact with.

The word *Person*, this Author tells us very truly, is a '*Forensic Term*', and tho' he would refer the Meaning of it to the *Soul* alone, yet the *Law* looks upon it in a more *Compound View*, and takes in the *Body* as well as the *Soul* of *Man*. Indeed the *Enquiries* of the *Law* are upon the *Facts*, not the *Consciousness* or *Conscience* of the *Offender*; and by *Person* the *Law* understands the *Partys* in *Suit*, or the *Prisoner* at the *Bar*.

In *Common Acceptation* *Person* is very properly apply'd to the *Characters* and *Offices* of *Men* in all their *Transactions*, *Sacred* or *Civil*, *Public* or *Private*, and is accordingly *Principal* or *Vicarial*; this hath no *Relation* to the *Intelligent Being* abstracted from the *Body*, and he that affronts, assaults, and wounds the *Man*, is properly said to affront, assault, and wound the *Person*.

When the *Scriptures* warn us against *accepting* of *Persons* in *Judgment*, the *Person* there is not the *Soul*, or the *Intelligent Being* as such, but the *Poor* the *Rich* or the *Mighty*; the *Person* of the

Prince, or the *Person* of the *Needy*: and when God is said to be no *Respecter of Persons*, it is not meant of the *Soul*, (for he truly respects the *Soul* alone) but in respect of the *Great* and *Mighty* of the *Jew* and *Gentile*.

This *Civil* and *Natural Personality* is dissolved by *Death*, and we say properly, there *was* such a *Person*, but he is *dead*; there *is* no such *Person* *now*: and this *Personality* is restor'd at the *Resurrection*, and the *Person* is said to *rise*, when the *Body* is rais'd and reunited to the *Soul*.

The word *Person*, when apply'd to pure Intellectual Beings, is borrowed from *Man*, and it is apply'd, not only as it respects the *Soul* of *Man*, but as it respects his *Actions*. In this sense we use the Word with Reference to the Holy Blessed and Undivided Trinity, because we cannot find a better to express the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as distinguished from each other by such *Acts*, as we properly call *Personal*. Now tho' the *Father* and the *Son* may be call'd two *Persons* by reason of their *Relation* as well as *Acts*, and the *Holy Ghost* a third *Person*, by reason of his *Relation* and *Personal Acts*, which distinguish him to be neither the *Father*, nor the *Son*, tho' *Angels*, which never are so call'd, may perhaps more properly be call'd *Persons*, because they are *Individuals*, yet the *Soul of Man* separately taken can never be call'd the *Person of Man*, because the *Person* consists, or is made up of the whole *Man*.

If we grant that by *Person* is understood an *Intelligent Being*, and that no *Being* else can be call'd a *Person*, yet it does not follow, that the

Soul alone, because an *Intelligent Being*, is therefore the *Person of Man*: It makes *Man a Person* indeed, because it makes him an *Intelligent Being*; but when we call *Man a Person*, we must include What makes him a *Man*, as well as What makes him a *Person*. *Man* had not been *Man*, had not God given him a *Body*, any more than *Angels* are *Men*, and therefore as he had not been *Man* without a *Body*, we may justly conclude, that where *Man is not*, there properly speaking cannot be the *Person of Man*.

By *Person* then when apply'd to us, is not to be understood an *Intelligent Being* alone as *such*, but an *Intelligent Compound Being* as *Man*, which makes the *Body* a Part of the *Person* as much as of the *Individual*.

If what I have deliver'd concerning the *Person of Man* be true, this Writer's Notion of *Identity* falls of course, unless *Consciousness* may be extended to the *Body*, not that the *Body* is *Conscious*, but that the *Soul is Conscious* of the *Body*, whether it be the *same* or *not*. But this is far from this Author's Meaning: The *Soul*, the *Person* according to him never regards what *Body* it is joyn'd to; and *Self*, by which he expresses *Identity of Person*, is the *same of whatever Substance it is made up, whether of the same, or other Substances*. But the Truth or Falshood of his Notions will best appear upon Examining

2. What he hath advanced concerning the *Identity of Person*.

This Author makes *Identity of Person* to consist in *Consciousness* only, and he makes the *Person* to consist of the *Soul* alone, or that *Thinking*

Thing within us, and yet he resolves that the *same Identical thinking Substance* is not necessary to the *Identity* of the *Person*: That the *Person* is the *same*, if his *Consciousness* be the *same*, whether the *thinking Substance* be the *same* or *no*, as if the *same Consciousness* was not necessarily annex'd to the *same Soul*; and so at last *Identity* of *Person* has nothing to do with the *Soul*, tho' the *Soul* be the *Person*, but consists in *Consciousness* alone apply'd or transferr'd to any ¹ *thinking Substance*.

From whence according to him it follows that even in *finite Substances*, one *Substance* may be *two Persons*; on the other hand, such is the *Power of Consciousness*, that supposing *two Men* had the *same Consciousness*, they would make but *one Person*, and according to his own Instance ² *Socrates* and the *Mayor of Quinborough* would be the *same*: if he had pleas'd, he might have added to each Case a *third Person*, and so of *three distinct Substances* have made but *one Person* or of *one Substance* three *distinct Persons*.

These are *Mysteries* not of *God's* revealing but of *Man's* own making, and if these Positions are true in *finite Substances*, methinks the Doctrine of a *Trinity* should not be so *incredible* in an *Infinite Being*. He that can make *one Substance* to be *different Persons* by reason of a *different Consciousness* in the *same Soul*, or *different*

¹ §. 12. The Question is, whether if the *same Substance*, that thinks, be changed, it can be the *same Person*, or remaining the *same* it can be *different Persons*; and he resolves. That the *Substance* changed the *Person* may be the *same*, and that the *Substance* remaining the *same*, the *Person* may be *different*. §. 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23. ² §. 19.

Men in different Ages to be the *same Person* by reason of the *same Consciousness* in *different Souls*, need not demur to any *Mystery* revealed in the *Gospel*.

When he makes *Person* to be an *intelligent Being* only, I should imagine, that *Consciousness* alone, in which he makes the *Identity* of the *Person* to consist, should while it secur'd the *Identity* of the *Person*, at the same time have preserv'd the *Identity* of the *intelligent Being*. But tho' *Person* be an *intelligent Being*, it is not, it seems, this or that *intelligent Being*, but may, if it can take its *Consciousness* along with it, transfer it self to another *Substance*, and be still the *same Person*, when it is no longer the *same Being*.

How the *Identity* of *Person* is consistent with the *Change* of that *Being*, in which the *Person* subsists, must be left to those that *hate Mysteries* to explain, and with me it shall be no Wonder, that *Identity* of *Person* may subsist in another *Body*, when so much Pains is taken to persuade us, that it may subsist in another *Soul*: unless by *Soul* perhaps is meant a *material Substance*, and then again my Wonder is at an End.

After all this it may be proper to consider, wherein *Identity* of *Person* do's truly consist, as it is apply'd to *Man*, and as the *Person* of *Man* is the proper Subject of this Question. To satisfy this Enquiry, I am bold to lay down this Conclusion, That *Identity* of *Person* as apply'd to *Man*, either to *Body* or *Soul* or *Both*, doth not consist in *Consciousness*, and so proceed to assert *Identity* of *Person*, answerable to my first Determination.

That *Consciousness* is no true Principle of *Identity*, is evident from the Wonders this Author ascribes to it, and the Account he gives of it. For this *Identifying Consciousness* is made, by the Writer, a thing that adheres to no one *determinate Subject*, and that which is of a desultory Nature leaping from one to another, making the same *Person distinct*, and *Another* the same can be no Principle of *Identity*.

But had he fix'd and determin'd this *Consciousness* to one and the same *numerical Soul*, yet the *Identity* of this *Soul* would not consist in *Consciousness*, any more than the *Identity* of the *Body*, to which it was join'd. For be the *Soul* what it will, *Person* or not *Person*, it's *Identity* consists in that Principle, which makes it one and preserves it the same, as it is compared with or related to other *Beings* of the same Nature, or of a *different Kind* from the Beginning throughout the whole Continuance of it's Duration. If it ceases to be the same *Substance*, or if it continues not numerically the same, its *Identity* is immediately lost: whether it be *Conscious* or not *Conscious*, *Intelligent* or not *Intelligent* is not the Question: The *Soul* is still the same as long as it exists in the *Body* or out of the *Body*. That it is *Conscious*, rises from the Will and Bounty of the *Creator*; that it is the same is owing to it's Continuance in that *Singularity* of it self, and that *Distinction* from other *Beings* in which it was created. Whatever makes *Identity* in other *Beings*, makes it in the *Soul*; and by the same Principle, the *Body* or any thing else is the same, that is the same also.

But further there is an *Identity* of *Body* as strict as of the *Soul*, and tho' the *Body* is said to consist of Particles in a continual Flux, and not to continue the *same* for any number of Years, yet this is not to be admitted without special Consideration. For tho' what we call the Humours and Flesh may be in a continual Flux and Succession, yet the *Solid parts* the *Substratum*, that supports the *Accidents*, must be the *same*; and the *Form* of our Bodies is like the *Forms* of other Bodies, *fixed* and *unalterable*. Plants and Flowers after all the Torture of the *Chymist*, after *Maceration* in the Mortar, and *Calcination* by the Fire, still remain in their *Forms*: and as by several Experiments they are found to be recoverable, and by a gentle Application of Heat to rise distinctly from their *Dust* and *Chaos*, in which they lie confused; they do give us at once a Demonstration of the *Identity* of the *Body*, and afford us a noble Instance of the *Body's rising again* from its *Ashes*, after it has been burnt and tortur'd a thousand Ways. God alone can see our *Substance*: we converse with our selves, as we do with other Bodies, by perceiving and viewing the *Accidents* and *Surface* only, and yet if *Consciousness* has any Relation to *Identity*, we have a *Consciousness* that our *Bodies* are the *same*, that they are *Part* of our *selves*, that is of our *Persons*, however altered to outward View by Age or Sicknefs.

But tho' we cannot describe this *Substance* of ours, this *Original Principle*, that is gradually *expanded* into all these Parts and Dimensions;

tho' we cannot describe the *Substratum* of our own *Bodies* any better than of *Stones* or *Metals* or any other *Bodies*, yet whatever it is that upholds this *Frame*, whatever that is which continues a *Likeness* in the Lines of the *Face*, in the *Conflux* and *Configurations* of the *Veins* and *Arteries*, and determines the *Body* to a particular *Make* and *Figure*, still answering, as were, to the *Mold* it was cast in; that, whatever it be, preserves the *Identity* of the *Body* and all that I should desire in this *Question* is that in the same *Sense* in which our *Bodies* are the same from the *Womb* to the *Grave*, however flux and alterable by the *Course* of *Time* we would only think, they may be as much the same at our *Resurrection*, and consist of *Parts* that were as properly *our own* at the time of *Death*, as any *Parts* are *our own* in any time of our *Life*.

Consciousness as it refers to our own Being a necessary *Act* of the *Mind*, which by our *Thinking* convinces us that we are; yet it is not confined to the *internal Act*, whereby we conclude that we do exist: but it extends to our *whole Being*. To speak properly and truly we are, while we live, as truly *Conscious* of the *Body's Existence* as of the *Soul's*; and when we die, tho' we are not *Conscious* to the *Body's Existence*, yet the *Soul* is *Conscious* of its *Separation*, and finds that *Personality*, which resulted from the *Union* of *Soul* and *Body*, to be *dissolv'd*. But neither our own *Existence* and *Identity*, nor the *Existence* of things and their *Identity*, depend upon our *Consciousness* or *Knowledge*: We are *what* we are, and the

re what they are; the *same* severally, each in *its* self, whether we are *Conscious*, or whether we know it or no. A Man is as much the *same* in *Lethargy* or a *Frenzy*, and his *Soul* is the *same* *numerical Soul*, as in the clearest *Exercise* of his *Reason*: and the *same Soul* while joyn'd to the *Body* is the *same Person*, notwithstanding that stretched Quibble of a *Man's* being not *Himself* or *beside Himself*, for no *Body* was ever so silly to think, that the *Person* was not the *same*, tho' the *Man* was *mad*.

To speak positively upon this Question, the *Identity* of *Person* consists in the *Principles* of *Individuation*: I say *Principles*, because there is a *Principle* of *Individuation*, which makes the *Body* *one* and the *same*; and there is a *Principle* of *Individuation*, which makes the *Soul* *one* and the *same*, and from the *Union* of these *two Individuals* arises a *third* the *Individual Person* of *Man*.

Now in all *Creatures* the *Principle* of *Individuation* is that which fixes their *numerical* and *Singular Existence*, when any *Creature* ceases to be the *Individual* it was, it ceases to be the *same*, and *Consciousness* therefore can be no *Principle* of *Identity*, because it is none of *Individuation*, but according to this *Writer's Hypothesis* changes and destroys the *Individual*, by being transferr'd from *one* to *another*.

To apply this to the Point before us: The *Author* tells us, ² that by this *Notion of Identity* we may be able without any difficulty to conceive the *same Person* at the *Resurrection*, tho' in a *Body* not exactly in *Make* or *Parts* the *same* which he had here, the *same Consciousness* going along with the *Soul* that inhabits

inhabits it. That is, the *Person* will be the *same* in a *different Body*, and in a *different Soul* too, in the *Consciousness* be but the *same*. For he tells us for a Foundation of this, ' *Let a Man once find himself Conscious of any of the Actions of Nestor he then finds himself the same Person with Nestor* and so without any difficulty you may conceive how by being *Nestor* he is the *same Person* at the *Resurrection*, he was, *before* he was *Nestor*: for this must be the Sense, if we fill up the Clause and when we *conceive the same Person*, do signify *what Person* we conceive.

But as in *conceiving the same Person* (which is oddly and indefinitely express'd) we may ask *Who the Person is*, or *what Person*? we may also ask, *At what Resurrection*, or the *Resurrection of what*? For this is a Word thrown in without any Meaning or Application: he does not mean the *Resurrection of the same Body*, that he utterly explodes: nor doth he mean the *Resurrection of the Dead from the Grave*, for that he explodes likewise: he cannot mean the *Resurrection of the Soul*, for that *do's* not *die*, at least he has not thought fit to say it *do's*; but he means the *Uniting of the Person*, or rather the *Consciousness of the Person* to some Portion of *Matter*, *other, like, or not like the Body of Man*; and this is his *Notion*, so far as I can drive him to a Point of the *Resurrection*.

But if This can be call'd a *Resurrection*, we must observe that it is not *this* or *that* determinate *Person* that *rises*, for if I once happen to find my self *Conscious* of any of the *Actions of Nestor*, then it is *Nestor* and not *I*, or *Nestor*

and *I* together, that are without any difficulty to be conceiv'd the *same Person* at the Resurrection.

We must confess these Notions are too refin'd for our Brains, and that we do not without any difficulty conceive, how the *Consciousness* of *Nestor* apply'd to the *Soul* of *Cato*, and joyn'd to some System of *Matter*, or other call'd a *Body*, makes the *same Person* at the Resurrection.

To these Subtilties it may be sufficient to oppose our plain Notions, and leave it to ordinary Understandings to determine in this Point between us. Let us for once suppose (to make the thing the easier) that every *Person*, that is, every *Soul* retain'd its *own Consciousness*, the Question is not, whether the *same Person* shall *live again* in a *Body*, but whether the *Man* that is *dead* shall *rise again* in *his own Body*: The *Soul* is not consider'd here any further than in its *Reunion* to the *Body*. ¹ *That* which *dies*, is to *revive*, *that* which is *laid in the Dust*, is to *rise again*; for if the *same Body* do's not *rise*, the *Man* cannot in any Sense be said to *rise again from the Dead*.

We are not enquiring any thing concerning that *Person* of his, which *never dies*, nor whether thro' *Consciousness* it continues the *same*, whatever *Body* it is joyn'd to; but we enquire in the plain Road of Common Sense, whether because nothing can rise from the dead, but what is dead, whether the *Body* that *died* shall *rise again*, and because *that Body* cannot *rise*, if *another* be *raised* in its *stead*, our plain Question

¹ See St Chrysostom. *αὐτὸς ὁ ἐν νεκρῶν ἀναστρέψας*. Tom. 6. p. 712.

is concerning the Resurrection of the *same Body*; and when the *same Body* is united to the *same Soul*, then we apprehend, that the *same Person* who died may be said to be *risen again*.

But this *Identity* of *Body* signifies nothing it seems with this Author, and his Reasoning upon it ends exactly in the same Conclusion with the *other*, that it is *indifferent what Body is united to the Soul at the Resurrection*, the *Body* being no more than a *Veil* or *Garment* to the *Soul*.

This brings me to consider

3. Thirdly, what the Author of the *Naked Gospel* has advanc'd concerning the Relation of the *Body* to the *Soul*.

My time will not permit me, and there is no necessity to be particular upon this Question. He makes the *Body* incapable of partaking either in Rewards or Punishment: he makes it *insensible* as a *Stone*, and allows it to share with us in Life no more *than the House we dwell in, or the Clothes we move in*, and therefore to argue, it must be the *same Body, that shall receive Punishment at the Resurrection is the same thing*, he says, *as to say, the Malefactor must be executed in the same Clothes, in which he committed the Crime.*¹

He pretends to ground his Assertion upon the Words of the *Apostle*. 2 Cor. 5. 1, &c. But he abuses the *Scripture* and perverts the *Apostle's* Meaning, for no one surely did ever expound those *Metaphors* to a *literal* Sense, nor ever concluded from them, that our *Bodies* were as *Lifeless* as the *Walls*, and had no more *Feeling* than our *Clothes*. The Passage tho' highly deserving

the most exact Consideration, is too long for a full Explication, only 'tis observable, that the *Apostle* speaking of our *Bodies* as the *Frail Tabernacle*, in which we *sojourn* for a little Time, and expressing his Confidence of a more *durable House, Eternal in the Heavens*, speaks still of the *same Body*, when he earnestly desires not to be *Unclothed*, but *Clothed upon, that Mortality*, or what is Mortal in us, *may be swallowed up of Life*, which is in the Words of this Chapter, that *this Mortal may put on Immortality*. So far is this Scripture from his Purpose, that it is a *rich* and a *pregnant* Proof of the *Resurrection* and *Glorification* of the *same Body*.

As to the Assertion it self, I shall not run into a Philosophical Disquisition, but content myself with these short Strictures upon it.

We do not know the *term* and *manner* of *Union* between the *Soul* and *Body*, nor how they *act reciprocally* upon *each other*, and it may be more difficult to assign a *pure Intellectual*, than a *meer Bodily Act*: perhaps the *Soul* cannot so *abstract it self*, as to leave the *Body Quiescent*, since the *Operations* of our *Minds* in this *united State* depend upon the *Texture* and *Disposition* of the *Body*.

But these things we understand: That there are in *Men* an *Animal Life*, and *Animal Functions*, *answerable* to those in *Brutes*: That *this Life* is maintain'd, and *these Functions* perform'd, and the *Species* continu'd in a manner exactly correspondent in *Man* and *Beast*: That *Death* or the *Dissolution* of this *Animal Life*, happens in the *same Way* to both by *Age*, by *Sickness*, or by

Violence: That *Brutes*, tho' they have no *Reflection*, have yet *Sensation*; and why *Man* may not be *sensible* in his *Body*, as *They* are in *theirs*, no good Reason can be assign'd: That *Sensation*, which in *Brutes* terminates in the *Animal Spirits*, should with *us* terminate in the *Soul*, must be ascrib'd to the *intimate Conjunction* of *Soul* and *Body*; but to say that in *us* the *Animal Life* has no *Sensation*, is to pronounce more than we can demonstrate.

So that the *Body* may be capable of *Pain*, and the *Soul* sensible of the *Body's Pain*, or if the *Body* were only a *Vehicle* or *Instrument* to administer *Pain* to the *Soul*, since this *Pain* may be convey'd by the *same*, as well as *another Body*, there may be some Reason, why the *same Body*, which was the *Instrument* of the *Soul* in *sinning*, should be *also* the *Instrument* of its *Punishment*.

But further, when we find several *Affections* and *Appetites* peculiar to the *Body*, which cannot even in this *State* of *Union* be properly apply'd to the *Soul*, we may understand that the *Body* hath not only *Life* and *Sensation*, but by reason of its *Appetites*, may be an *Accomplice* with the *Soul*, and may consequently, as *partaking* in the *Crime*, be made *Partaker* in the *Punishment*.

I pass over the *Affections* of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, *Weakness* and *Weariness*, *Sickness* and *Death*, which touch not the *Soul*, nay as to the last the *Soul* is often most *Vigorous* when the *Body* is *Weakest*, and is then most *Lively* when the *Body* is nearest its *Dissolution*.

The *Concupiscible Appetite* belongs properly to the *Animal Life*, without Respect to the *Rational*,

al, and it is the *Brute Part* in us, that is carried out to sensual Pleasures, to Lewdness and Intemperance: The *Soul* has no Share in these things, but *Consent* and *Consciousness*: These are *Actions* resulting from the *Animal Life* alone, and are proper, tho' not so common, to *Brutes* as to *Men*. That we are *Accountable* for them, because we have *Reason*, and that *Brutes* are not *accountable* is, because they have not *Reason*; and if we please to think, how much the *Soul* is influenced by the *Lower Appetites*, it may be admitted Reasonable, that the *Body* should suffer, or at least the *Soul* in the *same Body*.

Upon this way of Reasoning there may be more *Necessity* of the *Soul's* being punish'd in the *same Body*, than of a *Malefactor's* being executed in the *same Clothes* in which he committed the *Fact*. Because his *Body* may be something more concern'd than his *Coat*, and his *Head* not altogether so innocent as his *Hat*.

After all, that the *Body* is something more than a *Garment*, we may learn from Himself, when to serve another Purpose he pleads, *how little desirous the Soul would be of meeting her old Companion, from a Remembrance of all the Contentions, she had with it; all the Wounds, she receiv'd from it; and all the Dangers, which she narrowly escap'd by watching against it.* These Words have no Meaning, or within the *Body* he includes the *Fleshly Lusts* that war against the *Soul*.

But these are Inconsistencies familiar to these Writers, who will allow of no Absurdities, but those of *their own making*, and will suffer no Body to contradict them, but *themselves*.

This Doctrine we might imagine should be very mortifying to those, who on other Occasions express such a Concern for the *Body*, and have such *high Notions* of *organized Matter*; but when an *Article of Faith* is to be disputed, they can easily come into the same Conclusion, and with them it is not material *what Body* is joyn'd to the *Soul*.

Only the *Author* of the *Essay* must be so far excepted, that in stating *Identity* he neither admits the *Identity* of *Body* into his *Idea* of the *Identity* of *Man*, nor the *Identity* of the *Soul* into the *Identity* of *Person*; but *Consciousness* alone is *all in all*, and *that* being the *same*, it makes the *same Person*, *whatever Soul* or *Body* it is joyn'd to.

By what hath been said we find that there is somewhat a nearer *Relation* between *Soul* and *Body*, than between a *Man* and his *Apparel*; and if *Bodies* must be *raised*, it is not *altogether indifferent* to *what Body* the *Soul* is reunited at the *Resurrection*.

The *Author* of the *Essay* has a Notion of the *Resurrection* of the *Dead*, without any *Resurrection* of the *Body*, whether the *same* or another; But his *Resurrection* of the *Dead* is only a *Resurrection* of *Persons*, and as far as he holds the *Resurrection* of the *same Person*, 'tis no more than a *Resurrection* of the *same Consciousness*. This other Writer not quite so subtil only argues against the *Resurrection* of the *same Body* from those conclusive Topics; and some others as conclusive as those, which we have mentioned; and in opposition to both we may venture at last upon this just Conclusion: That

the same Numerical Bodies, which die, shall be rais'd again, and be united each to the same Soul, and so be brought to Judgment, there to receive Rewards and Punishments according to what every one hath done in his Body, whether it be Good or ¹ Bad; They, that have yeilded their Members as Instruments of Unrighteousness unto Sin, shall be punish'd in those Members or that Body; and they, that have yeilded themselves unto God, and their Members as Instruments of Righteousness unto God, shall be rewarded in those Members, or that Body which they compose. For we may conclude with ² St Chrysostom a much better Philosopher, because a better Christian than our Modern Reasoners, that it is not agreeable to Justice, that one Body should sin and another bear the Punishment, that the Members of Righteousness should be punished, and the Members of Unrighteousness rewarded; but every one shall bear his own Burden in his own Body: There is Sense and Reason and Justice in asserting the Resurrection of the same Body, because there can be no Resurrection out of that which died, and especially because of the Sentence to Life or Death Eternal, which is to follow. But to contend for any other Resurrection is absurd, and no less, than under the Notion of another to deny any at all.

To raise the same Body out of the Dust into which it is resolv'd, is more Natural than out of other Matter to create and organize a New one. And to give to every Soul its own Body again, is most agreeable to our plain Conceptions; For it would look very strange to see a Believer's

1 2 Cor. 5. 10.

2 Hom. 10. tom. 3.

Soul joyn'd to an Atheist's Body, or the Soul of an Infidel in the Body of a Saint.

Concerning the *Possibility* of a Resurrection in *General*, and of an *Identical* Resurrection in *Particular* I need not discourse, till we meet with such Arguments as have not been answered.

And I have no Room to proceed to the *Order* of the Resurrection, tho' that very *Order* yields some peculiar Arguments for the rising of the *same Body*, and shews the Resurrection to be no *confused undistinguish'd Act*, but an Act of the justest *Regard* and *Discretion*, an Act of *Separation* of the *Righteous* from the *Wicked*, in which such an *Array* and *Disposition* is used in bringing Mankind to *Judgment*, as is highly suitable to the *Majesty*, *Mercy*, and *Justice* of the *Judge*, and to the *Proceedings* and *Solemnity* of that *great Tribunal*.

But I shall close the whole with an Application of some Scriptures to the Doctrine we have been defending, which will help to shew that the Question is truly of the *Body*, the *very same Body*, tho' our *Adversaries* say, we do not find that the Scriptures do in express Terms mention the Resurrection of the *Body*, much less of the *same Body*. And truly I take the plain Reason to be, that the *Holy Scriptures* trusted to the *Common Sense* and *Apprehension* of *Mankind*, that we could not think of any Resurrection but that of the *Body*, nor of any *Body* but the *same*.

For besides the Propriety of the very Notion from the Scriptures we learn that our *Bodies*

1 N. G. and Mr Lock against the Bp of Worcester.

are redeem'd as well as our Souls: *Ye are bought with a Price: therefore glorify God in your Body and in your Spirit, which are God's.* 1 Cor. 6. 20. To which I may add the Exhortation to the *Romans* 12. 1. *I beseech you therefore, Brethren, by the Mercies of God, that ye present your Bodies a living Sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is our reasonable Service.* From the same place in the *Corinthians* (6. 19.) we are taught that *our Bodies are the Temples of the Holy Ghost*, and therefore not to be defiled; and with Respect to our most merciful Redeemer, we are not only *Partakers of his Spirit*, but are *Members of his Body, of his Flesh, and of his Bones.* Ephes. 5. 30. Now what the Consequence is of this Union between *Christ* and *us*, we are instructed in the Text, he is the *First Fruits*, we are the *Harvest*. But particularly in the eighth Chapter to the *Romans*: *Now if any Man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. But if the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the Dead, dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the Dead, shall also quicken your Mortal Bodies by the Spirit, that dwelleth in you.* V. 11.

Let us mortify therefore our Members, which are upon the Earth, and regard our Bodies as the Temples of God,² and while we³ wait for the Redemption of our Bodies, having an assured Faith, that they shall be redeemed from the Grave, let us remember that we are Citizens of that New Jerusalem, which is Free, and the Mother of us all, that we are entituled to all its Privileges and Immunities, and shall be fully admitted to them,

1 Col. 3. 5. 2 1 Cor. 3. 16. 3 Rom. 8. 23. 4 Gal. 4. 26.

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if

if we forfeit not our *Charter*, and lose not our *Right of Inheritance*.

And therefore, let us pray, that ¹ *our whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preserved blameless unto the Coming of our Lord Jesus Christ*. That he may ² *present us Holy and unblameable and unreprouvable in the sight of God*.

³ *Only let our Conversation be as becomes the Gospel of Christ*, suitable to our blessed *Hopes and Interests in Heaven*, ⁴ *From whence also we look for a Saviour the Lord Jesus, who shall change our Vile Body, that it may be fashioned like unto his Glorious Body, according to the Working, whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto Himself*. To Him therefore with the Father, and the Holy Spirit be ascribed, as is most due, all Honour, Praise, Might, Majesty, and Dominion for ever and ever. Amen.

1 1 Thess. 5. 23. 2 Col. 1. 22. 3 Philip. 1. 27. 4 Ib. 3. 20, 21.



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